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Capital Requirements of German Banks 
and the European Community 
Proposais on Banking Supervision 
Bernd Rudolph 
The German banking industry has seconded the proposal for a Single 
European banking market and the establishment of a 'fair level playing field'. 
In banking Services, this implies the harmonization of rules on capital 
adequacy. The Cooke committee at the Bank for International Settlements 
and the European Commission have been working on new capital guidelines 
and deposit protection schemes. It is argued in this chapter that capital 
adequacy regulations significantly affect the competitive positioning of the 
German banking industry. 
The chapter is structured as follows. The German banking System, its 
supervisory controls and the deposit insurance mechanisms are described in 
section 11.1 and the effects of the new capital regulations are assessed in 
section 11.2. 
11.1 The German Banking Industry and its 
Supervisory System 
11.1.1 The Structure of the German Banking System 
It is common practice to divide the German banking industry into three 
groups differing mainly with respect to the legal form of their member banks 
and to their connecting banking associations as well as their related 
regulations and deposit protection schemes. These three groups are the 
commercial banks, the savings banks and the credit cooperatives. Two of 
these groups, the savings banks and the credit cooperatives, operate within 
well defined areas ( R e g i o n a l p r i n z i p ) and therefore do not compete with one 
another. But this R e g i o n a l p r i n z i p no longer holds for their central institutions 
running branch offices in Frankfurt for instance. In many aspects the 
competing units are the banking groups, acting in Joint competition 
( G r u p p e n w e t t b e w e r b ) , but competition in retail banking acts mainly on a 
local basis. The German unification process did not change the principal 
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structure of the German banking System, but the groups and Single banks 
showed definitive different strategies in penetrating the markets of the 'Neue 
Länder'. 
C o m m e r c i a l banks are organized as stock corporations or limited liability 
companies. For Statistical purposes they are usually divided into four sub-
groups: the three big banks with their Berlin subsidiaries and a nationwide 
network of more than 3,000 branches; the very heterogeneous group of 
so-called regional banks operating nationwide with only a limited number 
of branches, or only in a certain region, or as Single banks like most of the 
subsidiaries of foreign banks belonging to this group; the branches of foreign 
banks; the private bankers, the oldest group within the banking industry but 
nowadays with only a few independent houses neither owned nor controlled 
by other banks. 
The savings b a n k sector consists of more than 750 local saving institutions 
and their 11 regional central institutions, the L a n d e s b a n k e n / G i r o z e n t r a l e n , 
including a central institution, the Deutsche Girozentrale—Deutsche 
Kommunalbank, with similar functions. With a few exceptions savings 
banks are incorporated under public law and owned by their respective 
municipalities or districts. The Landesbanken are organized as public law 
corporations and owned by the State itself and/or the State savings banks 
association. At the moment the Landesbanken are considering building larger 
groups through mergers with other giro institutions or larger savings banks. 
The last of the three sectors, the c r e d i t c o o p e r a t i v e s consists of more than 
3,000 local credit cooperatives, eight regional institutions and a central 
institution. The local institutions are organized in the legal form of cooper-
atives, and the regional institutions are organized as stock corporations. 
Recently the central institution of the credit cooperatives sector, the Deutsche 
Genossenschaftsbank, planned to acquire all the regional institutions with the 
aim of building an only two-tiered System in this sector, but after high losses 
the position of the remaining institutions has been strengthened. However, as 
1992 approached, merger activities were stimulated in all sectors of the 
German banking System. 
While the savings banks and cooperative banks show a certain 'unity and 
harmony, as a result of the regional Organization which practically excludes 
competition within each group, commercial banks work together only on 
general economic and public relations matters' (Scheidl, 1988). Therefore, 
the central Organization of the commercial banks (Bundesverband deutscher 
Banken) is a loose association representing its members' interests whereas the 
association of savings banks (Deutscher Sparkassen-und Giroverband) and 
the association of credit cooperatives (Bundesverband der Deutschen Volks-
banken und Raiffeisenbanken) undertake more central functions for their 
members. 
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The banks of all three banking groups are called u n i v e r s a l banks because 
in principle they carry out the füll ränge of commercial and investment 
banking Services. This common characteristic does not exclude some 
specialization with respect to certain customers or business activities on the 
basis of historical, regional or Strategie differences. Therefore we cannot 
speak of a uniform type of universal banks. Only the three large branch 
banks, some other large regional banks and the central institutions of the 
savings and corporate banks operate as universal banks in a definitive sense, 
i.e. as institutions offering the whole ränge of banking Services and at the 
same time holding shares and supervisory board memberships in non-bank 
companies as well as exercising equity voting rights.1 The same institutions 
or most of them (with obvious and noteworthy differences) have built up a 
European or global network of subsidiaries and affiliates. The other 
institutions called universal banks offer a wide ränge of Services in their 
regional district (partly in connection with their central institutions) but do not 
exhibit any other features of the large banks. 
In addition to the three groups of universal banks mentioned above, there 
are a number of specialized banks with different legal forms and sometimes 
with their own associations and regulations. Some of the specialized banks 
are included in the statistics of the German Central Bank, the Deutsche 
Table 11.1 The institutional strueture of the German banking System 
No. of Volume of 
reporting banks business 
at end of 1990 (billion D M ) 
Commercial banks 341 1,408,979 
Big banks 6 468,554 
Regional and other commercial banks 192 801,398 
Branches of foreign banks 60 76,291 
Private bankers 83 62,736 
Savings banks 598 1,842,624 
Central and regional giro institutions 11 761,769 
Savings banks 771 1,080,855 
Credit cooperatives 3,487 808,576 
Central and regional institutions 4 216,687 
Credit cooperatives 3,392 591,889 
Mortgage banks 36 611,217 
Private mortgage banks 27 456,721 
Public mortgage banks 9 154,496 
Special functions banks 18 490,570 
Postal giro and savings banks 16 72,876 
A l l categories of banks 4,589 5,243,842 
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Bundesbank, namely the mortgage banks, the special functions banks and the 
postal giro and postal savings banks. The grouping of these statistics gives 
a rough idea of the institutional structure of the German banking System (see 
table 11.1 for this grouping, together with data on the number of the banks 
in each sector and their respective business volumes at the end of 1990). 
Other specialized banks, which are normally not included in the statistics 
of the Bundesbank, are the Bausparkassen (institutions similar to building 
and loans associations), investment companies, securities Clearing houses and 
special guarantee banks. We shall not deal with these institutions here 
because, with one exception, they are not real competitors of the universal 
or specialized banks. The one exception are the building and loan associations 
which operate under a special law but nevertheless are central to the financial 
Services industry. In the following we shall concentrate on the universal 
banks and only occasionally refer to related problems concerning the 
specialized banks. 
11.1.2 The Development and Basic Structure of the 
Supervisory System 
D e v e l o p m e n t of t h e s u p e r v i s o r y System 
The fundamental law on the supervision of German banks is the B a n k i n g A c t 
of 10 July 1961 (Gesetz über das K r e d i t w e s e n , K W G ) , 2 which replaced the 
Banking Act of 1934. The introduction of general supervision of banks was 
a consequence of the banking crisis of 1931, which culminated in the 
illiquidity of the Danatbank in 1931.3 Prior to 1931 only partial legislation 
had existed with respect to banking supervision, for example the Mortgage 
Bank Act of 1899. In 1931 and 1932 a number of emergency Orders set up 
for the first time a comprehensive system of governmental supervision of all 
banks. These Orders were Consolidated in the Banking Act of 1934 
(Reichsgesetz über das K r e d i t w e s e n ) , which established the principle that 
banking had to be licensed and regulated following certain guidelines. 
After the war bank supervision was carried out at State, as opposed to 
federal, level. A uniform regulatory framework did not exist until the passing 
of the Banking Act in 1961, which at the same time created the legal basis 
for the establishment of the Federal Banking Supervisory Office in Berlin. 4 
The Banking Act of 1961, which remained essentially unaltered for 15 years, 
adopted the central elements of the pre-war legislation. The first substantial 
changes were brought about by the amendment of the Banking Act in 1976. 
This amendment act incorporated various attempts to remedy certain 
weaknesses in the banking system which had become particularly apparent in 
connection with the collapse of Bankhaus I.D. Herstatt on 26 June 1974 
(stricter rules on the extension of large-scale credits, on the information 
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required of borrowers and on the Banking Supervisory Office's rights of 
information and investigation). The 1976 amendments had been preceded and 
accompanied by other measures to improve the viability of the banking 
system. The developments following the Herstatt crisis support the thesis that 
the development of banking supervision is mainly a reaction to current 
political pressures: the introduction of Principle Ia to limit risks from open 
currency positions relative to the bank's liable capital in August 1974; the 
foundation of the Liquiditätskonsortialbank in September 1974 with the 
objective of Standing by in cases of liquidity shortages; the establishment of 
the study group G r u n d s a t z f r a g e n der K r e d i t w i r t s c h a f t in November 1974;5 
the reform and further development of the deposit protection schemes by the 
savings banks in December 1975, by the commercial banks in May 1976 and 
by the credit cooperatives in April 1977. 
The second larger revision of the Banking Act was brought about by the 
Third Act to Amend the Banking Act which came into effect on 1 January 
1985. Legislative actions which led to the 1985 amendments were expedited 
by the fmancial difficulties of the private bankers Schroeder, Münchmeyer, 
Hengst & Co. (SMH-Bank) in the autumn of 1983, although this case resulted 
in a remarkable rescue Operation by the private banking Community in 
concert with the authorities. 
The 1985 amendments produced extensive changes in the regulatory 
system. Most importantly, they prescribed consolidation of banking groups, 
including foreign subsidiaries, for the purpose of both capital adequacy ratios 
and large-scale credit ratios. Until then the banks could build up so-called 
credit pyramids through their subsidiaries without a corresponding increase 
in the capital base of the parent bank, thereby bypassing the restrictions on 
business based on the bank's liable capital. In addition to these consolidation 
requirements the 1985 amendments reduced the ceiling for large-scale credits 
from 75 to 50 per cent of the equity, supplemented the provisions on equity 
by establishing stricter requirements for silent capital participation and by 
recognizing special participation rights, the so-called Genußscheine, as 
equity capital. 6 Such capital must not, however, exceed 25 per cent of the 
other liable capital. 
A i m s a n d r e g u l a t i n g I n s t r u m e n t s of b a n k i n g s u p e r v i s i o n 
Section 6 of the Banking Act quotes three functions of the supervisory 
authority which has the task of supervising banking institutions in accordance 
with the provisions of the Banking Act: the Federal Banking Supervisory 
Office shall counteract undesirable developments in banking which may 
endanger the safety of the assets entrusted to banks, adversely affect the 
orderly conduct of banking business or result in serious disadvantages for the 
domestic economy. 
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There is some debate as to whether the three functions are of equal 
importance or whether there are one or two main functions. In the past some 
authors seemed to give equal prominence to the protection of deposits and 
therefore to a special protection of the deposit owners on the one hand and 
the safeguarding of the orderly functioning of the banking system on the other 
hand. However, there has recently been a tendency to define the protection 
of the functioning of the banking system as the main task of banking super-
vision. The 1985 amendments to the Banking Act underline this position in 
explicitly stating in section 6 (3) that the supervisory authority shall exercise 
its functions exclusively in the public interest.7 In addition to this debate, 
some hold the opinion that the instruments of the supervisory authority which 
serve the objective of deposit or lender protection also serve the objective 
of protecting the functioning of the banking system. This view can be 
legitimately held if one remembers that a bank collapse can be infectious.8 
The instruments of the supervisory authority can be classified in several 
ways. One possibility is to distinguish the instruments regulating entry to and 
exit from the banking market (licensing, start-up capital, powers to intervene) 
and instruments governing banking Operations. We shall only deal with the 
second class of instruments concerning ongoing banking activities. These 
instruments can be classified as the so-called structural norms and the 
informational rights and obligations. 
Structural norms are as follows: 
1 provisions regarding equity and liquidity; 
2 limitations of investments; 
3 rules governing the extension and diversification of large-scale loans; 
4 rules governing loans to borrowers closely associated with the lending 
bank (Organkredite). 
Informational norms are as follows: 
1 reporting obligations; 
2 annual financial Statements; 
3 credit information exchange concerning loans of a million D M or more; 
4 bank audits; 
5 rights of information and investigation. 
B a s i c f e a t u r e s of t h e s t r u c t u r a l n o r m s 
The structural norms on banking Operations, which are set forth in sections 
10—20 of the Banking Act, relate to the definition of bank equity, the main-
tenance of adequate capital and liquidity, consolidation for supervisory 
purposes, and finally to the limitations of investments and credits in relation 
to equity capital. 
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Section 10 of the Banking Act defines what is to be regarded as liable 
capital (paid-up share capital plus reserves plus certain elements according 
to the legal form of the bank). Section 10 also requires banks to maintain 
adequate liable capital in order to fulfil their obligations to their creditors and 
particularly in order to safeguard the assets entrusted to them. The Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office draws up Principles according to which it 
assesses as a rule whether the requirement of adequate liable capital is 
satisfied. 
Principle I stipulates that a bank's loans and participations should not exceed 
eighteen times its liable capital. In accordance with the proposals of the E C , 
special financial instruments such as financial swaps, futures and options 
have also had to be counted in Principle I since October 1990. As banks are 
not exposed to credit risk for the füll face value of their contracts, but only 
to the cost of replacing the cash flow if a counterparty defaults, those 
engagements will be converted to credit risk equivalents. Two different ways 
exist to calculate the 'credit equivalent amount', one incorporating a 'mark 
to market' element, the other one regarding the maturity of the contract. For 
calculating the Principle I ratio the loans and the credit equivalent amounts 
are weighted in accordance with various risk groups. The parent banks of 
banking groups must ensure that Principle I is also complied with on a 
Consolidated basis. 
Principle Ia limits the open positions in foreign exchange, precious metal 
trading and special off-balance-sheet instruments such as interest rate options 
and futures, forward rate agreements, stock options and futures, and index 
options and futures as a proportion of the bank's liable capital on a daily 
basis. 
Section 11 of the Banking Act stipulates that banks invest their funds in 
such a way as to ensure adequate liquidity all the time. Liquidity is assessed 
according to principles II and III. 
Principle II restricts the sum of the long-term assets to certain financial 
resources which are deemed to be long term. 
According to Principle III the sum of various short- and medium-term assets 
should not exceed short- and medium-term financial resources. 
In essence Principles II and III establish limitations on the banks' ability 
of maturity intermediation and transformation. Table 11.2 shows the average 
ratios of Principles I, II and III in the last ten years and makes clear that on 
average, banks can follow the requirements on capital and liquidity better 
today than in the past. However, there are marked differences between the 
banking groups, and we know that there are also large differences between 
the individual banks which cannot be obtained from the statistics. 
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Table 11.2 Average utilization of Principles I, II and III 
Principle I Principle II Principle III 
(limit 18) (limit 100%) (limit 100%) 
A l l banks ( a v e r a g e o n a n a n n u a l b a s i s ) 
1977 12.7 86.1 73.5 
1980 14.0 91.7 82.9 
1985 13,4 90.2 78.2 
1986 12.7 87.9 71.3 
1987 12.3 86.7 65.2 
1988 12.4 88.4 65.6 
1989 12.6 89.5 66.9 
1990 12.6 88.8 69.6 
B a n k i n g g r o u p s ( a v e r a g e s o n t h e basis of 1 9 9 0 ) 
Commercial banks 12.7 85.5 88.0 
Regional giro institutions 15.1 89.4 56.5 
Regional institutions of 7.1 86.9 57.1 
the cooperative sector 
Savings banks 12.4 91.6 56.2 
Credit cooperatives 11.7 88.9 63.0 
A l l banks 12.6 88.8 69.6 
Section 12 of the Banking Act stipulates that a bank's fixed assets and 
shareholdings in other enterprises must not exceed its liable capital. 
In section 13 of the Banking Act the loans to a Single borrower exceeding 
15 per cent of the bank's liable capital (large loans) are restricted in two ways 
to enforce diversification: no Single loan may exceed 50 per cent of the liable 
capital (to be reduced to 25 per cent in the future according to the EC 
proposals), and all large loans taken together must not exceed eight times the 
liable capital. These limits also apply to banking groups as a whole. Finally, 
loans to borrowers closely linked to the lending bank (insider loans) must be 
granted on the basis of unanimous decisions by all managers of the bank and 
only with the explicit approval of the supervisory board (section 15 of the 
Banking Act). 
11.1.3 Deposit Protection Schemes 
A l l banks belong to one of the deposit guarantee funds set up on a voluntary 
basis by the banking associations. The fund established for the commercial 
banks aims primarily at protecting depositors, while the schemes operated by 
the savings banks and credit cooperatives are designed to avert insolvency of 
member banks. 
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The Deposit Guarantee Fund of the commercial bank sector safeguards 
non-securitized liabilities to non-bank creditors in cases of insolvency. The 
protected deposits per creditor amount to up to_ 30 per cent of the last 
published annual liable capital number. Larger liabilities are protected up 
to this guarantee limit. Protection Covers both deposits in Germany and 
those at branches abroad, irrespective of the currency in which they are 
denominated and no matter whether the creditors are residents or non-
residents. The banks have to pay a contribution of 0.3 per thousand of the 
balance-sheet item 'liabilities to other creditors arising from banking 
business'. 
Although in the case of public savings banks responsibility for indemnify-
ing depositors ultimately rests with the local authorities which set up the 
bank, the savings banks and giro associations have nevertheless set up 
guarantee funds. The by-laws of the credit cooperatives provide for a limited 
Obligation of members to pay up further capital if called. However, the 
guarantee scheme operated by the credit cooperatives has ensured that not a 
Single insolvency with füll loss of value for one of the members has yet arisen 
in the credit cooperative sector. 
11.2 The Development of the German Bank Supervisory 
System under the Second Banking Directive 
German regulations concerning the soundness of individual banks as well as 
the stability of the banking system are currently being reviewed. Even though 
Principles I and Ia on capital adequacy do already regulate risks of financial 
swaps, futures and options they will have to be adjusted to account for banks' 
securities in order to incorporate the new EC proposals. In what follows, we 
give a short overview of these new rules and their effects on German law. 
More specifically, we focus on capital adequacy regulation. 
As discussed in chapter 1, the driving force of the EC proposals is not the 
complete harmonization of national regulations, but rather the opening of 
financial markets guided by three principles: mutual recognition, home 
country control and minimal harmonization of the defmition of own funds and 
capital rules. 
11.2.1 The Regulation of Capital 
The Commission followed closely the recommendations of the Cooke 
committee I n t e r n a t i o n a l C o n v e r g e n c e of C a p i t a l M e a s u r e m e n t a n d C a p i t a l 
S t a n d a r d s , with one major difference. The Cooke regulations concern 
international banks exclusively, while the EC proposals concern all credit 
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institutions. In what follows, we consider the proposals of the Cooke 
committee and those of the Commission together. 
The Cooke report deals with four topics: the definition of bank capital, the 
risk-weighting Systems for assets, the solvency ratio and the timetable for 
implementation. The definition of capital is the most controversial issue. 
Bank own funds are divided in two tiers, core capital and supplementary 
capital. Core capital includes equity (issued and fully paid ordinary shares as 
well as perpetual non-cumulative preference shares) and disclosed retained 
earnings. It is wholly visible in the published accounts and is the basis on 
which market judgements are made. The committee requires at least 50 per 
cent of capital to consist of core elements. Supplementary capital consists of 
the following elements which may be included by national authorities at their 
discretion. Elements not mentioned in the proposals cannot be included in the 
second tier. 
Undisclosed reserves are unpublished or hidden reserves which can be 
included if they have passed through the profit and loss account and if they 
are accepted by the authority. In Germany, this reserve is identified by the 
so-called 26a reserve. According to section 26a of the Banking Act, banking 
firms are allowed to show accounts receivables and securities held as current 
assets at a lower value than actual ones. These reserves are a special vehicle 
to safeguard against the particular risks inherent in the business of banking 
institutions. According to the 1986 Council Directive on Annual Accounts, 
these reserves have to be limited to 4 per cent of assets. The reserves defined 
under section 26a will probably be included in supplementary capital. 
Revaluation reserves may arise when a bank revalues certain assets to 
reflect current market values. The German associations are calling for the 
legal acceptance of revaluation, while the Bundesbank and the Federal 
Banking Supervisory Office want to exclude such reserves.9 
General loss reserves are created by banks to absorb anticipated but as yet 
unidentified future credit losses. The effective accounting law for German 
banks does not recognize general loan provisions, but Article 38 of the 
European Directive on Annual Accounts defines such an item. Therefore, we 
can anticipate that German law will recognize general reserves.1 0 
Hybrid debt capital instruments are instruments which combine some 
characteristics of debt and equity. In Germany Genußcheine do qualify for 
own funds (up to 25 per cent of the other components). Therefore, in this 
case, core capital as specified by Cooke is more narrowly defined. 
11.2.2 Consequences of the New Capital Regulations for 
German Banks 
Calculations by the Bundesbank have shown that the minimum solvency 
ratios of the Cooke guidelines - 4 per cent for core capital and 8 per cent 
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in total — are being met by German banks with 5 per cent and 9 per cent 
respectively. However, these calculations take all capital elements into 
account, even if they are not accepted by German regulation. This is 
understandable, since, in the opinion of the Bundesbank, the Cooke ratio is 
only voluntary at present. 
This voluntary basis cannot be maintained for the solvency ratios of the 
E C . Supplementary capital will only include those elements accepted by the 
German Banking Act. It is not yet clear what will be included, but it seems 
that the Bundesbank will follow a narrow definition of capital. This raises a 
question about the impact of the capital guidelines on the competitive 
positioning of the German banking industry. 
In a pure Modigl iani-Mil ler world, capital ratios will have no effect on 
profitability. Larger equity leading to higher solvency will be reflected in 
lower cost of deposits. However, this reasoning assumes füll information, 
rationality of depositors and tax neutrality, three hypotheses which can be 
questioned. Our view is that capital is a costly resource. 
So far, it is not clear whether the German regulatory authorities will 
adopt a more narrow or a more broad definition of capital. Of course, a 
compromise has to be found. It should be based on the concept of two-tier 
equity and abandon the current Single definition of capital. Unfortunately, 
neither the Cooke report nor the EC directive offer a thorough explanation 
of the function of second-tier capital. A well-known study by the Committee 
on Financial Markets of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) has come up with a useful definition: 'Core capital 
should include all elements permanently available to absorb losses; they must 
not impose contractual charges against earnings; they must not be redeemable 
at the holders' requesf (Pecchioli, 1987). Revaluation and undisclosed 
reserves clearly meet these Standards and should be included in core capital. 
The current capital ratio of 18, which can be converted into a capital-to-asset 
ratio of 5.5 per cent, will pose no problem for German banks since the 
current 5.5 per cent can include subordinated debt up to 20 per cent. 
Therefore Principle I is in line with the 4 per cent core capital ratio. The 
main issue lies with supplementary capital and the inclusion or exclusion of 
hidden reserves or revaluation of assets. 
In conclusion, the supervisory authorities in Germany should avoid 
penalizing the German banks. This implies a revision of the Banking Act, the 
introduction of the concept of two-tier capital and a broad definition of 
supplementary capital. 
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Notes 
1 Cable (1985) states that the German banking system is virtually indispensable to 
companies seeking external finance. This finding is somewhat outdated as far as 
debt financing is concerned. Bank control, through board membership, 
shareholding and proxy rights, relates mainly to large stock companies. These 
companies succeed in avoiding controls by maintaining about ten core 
relationships with banks. Moreover, large companies have access to the 
Euromarkets. However, the hausbankprinzip seems to play a larger role for 
external equity financing. 
2 For a more detailed analysis of the development of bank supervision in Germany, 
see Deutsche Bundesbank, Banking Act of the Federal Republic of Germany, 
Deutsche Bundesbank Special series no. 2, Schneider (1984), Schneider et al. 
(1986) and Fitzenreiter (1988). 
3 James (1985) states that the collapse of 1931 was immediately attributable to 
monetary conditions. The best known study on this topic is that of Born (1967). 
4 The Banking Act provides for Cooperation with the Deutsche Bundesbank. While 
the Federal Banking Supervisory Office is the only institution responsible for 
granting or withdrawing banking licences, the Bundesbank is involved in 
permanent supervision by collecting and processing data. 
5 The study group published its report Grundsatzfragen der Kreditwirtschaft in 
1979. The work and results of this extensive study of universal banking in 
Germany are outlined by Krümmel (1980). 
6 For a short description of the main characteristics of Genußcheinkapital see 
Rudolph (1988). 
7 Therefore no depositor has the right of recourse to the supervisory authorities in 
the case of a bank failure. 
8 See the article 'Bundesbank ist besorgt ueber EG-Beschluss', in Frankfurter 
Allgemeine Z e i t u n g , 14 December 1988. 
9 See Rudolph (1991). 
10 Loan loss general reserves are part of core capital in the latest version of the EC 
proposal (Article 2). 
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